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ON SOME INSTANCES OF VIOLENCE OR KILLING
AND THEIR JUSTIFICATION
IN CHRISTIANITY AND JAPANESE BUDDHISM
1
Violence and religion
The main topic we attempt to discuss here is by no means no simple nor quite
suitable to be considered in such a short article, but since our aim is not in showing
all instances of justiﬁcation of violence in the whole history of Christianity and
Buddhism we feel that we may carry out our task with reasonable success. We
will focus only on the most representative and common explanations that were
employed as justiﬁcation for acting against and, in fact, negating some of the
central concepts of the very teaching of the respective religions.
We are aware that a Westerner writing about religion and violence is in
a way biased by the recent trends of political correctness of regarding one religion
as violent and easily absolving other that used or keep using violence in similar
or even more extensive way. As a society we also like to think that violence for
us is a thing of the past and that ours is the history of development of morality
that deems violence unnecessary and unwelcomed. But, as John Docker states at
the very beginning of his book on origins of violence it is more likely that: “The
history of humanity is the history of violence: war and genocide; conquest and
colonization and the creation of empires sanctioned by God or the gods in both
polytheism and monotheism; the fatal combination of democracy and empire; and
1 Since killing is a form of violence there should be no need to make this distinction here, but
we have chosen to specify killing as an extreme manifestation of violent behavior because it also
seems to be generally perceived as something essentially diﬀerent.
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revolution, massacre, torture, mutilation, cruelty.”2 No matter how hard we try, it
is diﬃcult to believe that overall presence of violence in the world is signiﬁcantly
lesser than a few decades ago, a few centuries ago or some thousands years ago.
The only diﬀerence is that the violence is applied in a diﬀerent way, but the
essence of it seems remain intact and sound. It is an essential part of our lives and
seems to be present at all levels and in all areas of our everyday activities. But
even under such conditions, some try not to relay on any kinds of violence even
in cases where it is openly accepted in a given time and place. We hope to think
that higher level of cultural development, education and intelligence goes in hand
with diminishing of violence, but the reality shows us that it is not the case and
only the ways of implementing violence get more sophisticated.
Taking up these kinds of problems we also need to proceed with caution not to
impose present moral standards on the past factors and refrain from making any
judgments based on them, what is signiﬁcantly more diﬃcult when talking about
religion. However since the main aim of this article lies not in evaluation of moral
or religious behaviors but in the analysis of motivations and what triggers certain
kinds of behaviors, the danger of imposing modern morality can be regarded as
neglectable.
The problems discussed here are also very important for an individual moral
agent, since, no need to say, the interpretation and evaluation of historical facts
and developments have bearing on the moral choices an individual makes. They
will also hopefully oﬀer help in objective and thorough analysis of the motivation
employed for certain moral decisions and behaviors of persons of religion based
ethics.
And lastly we need to emphasize that we do not intend to criticize Chris-
tianity, Buddhism or any other religion as such but only will be trying to
understand the motivations and expectations of believers objectively and clearly
acting against the teaching of the very religion they follow, in other words, we
want to consider, among others, if monks committing violence behave that way
consciously against their beliefs or would they have committed similar crimes
anyway even religion had been not involved, or is there something in their religious
beliefs that makes them behave that way or at least does not condemn them
for doing so.
2 John Docker, The Origins of Violence. Religion, History and Genocide, (London: Pluto
Press, 2008), 2.
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On religious and non religious ethics
It seems that violence and killing are a part of our human condition and there
is no way to be a human and not to feel a temptation for violence or even murder,
but along the development of societies we have created rules for acceptable and
forbidden behaviors that were later systematized and incorporated into religious
beliefs to become laws that would later relate to these beliefs to hold. Thought
it seems that there is no need for ethics or morality to be based on speciﬁc
religious beliefs, religion seemed to oﬀer the easiest way for implementing these
rules and also provided a set of possible punishments for oﬀenders that would
not be available for nonreligious ethics and had, in some cases, also preventive
eﬀects.
When we try to consider the problem of violence usually it is necessary to
make clear what kind of ethics and morality we are going to build our argument
on. For some people the only reasonable ethical system is one that is based on solid
religious grounds. Since if there is no God to warrant the rewards and punishments
then the existence of morality is not possible whatsoever and the only option we
have left is dog-eat-dog world. On the other hand we also have clear examples of
working moral systems that are religion free and still gaining even better results
than religion based ones.3 Here we are not to decide which kind of morality is
a better one, but just need to point out, that moral behavior of an individual
may be guided by a religious belief or by certain convictions that are not religious
in their nature. The reason is that when we try to analyze the violent behavior
of a religious person we also need to consider if the person behaves in a certain
way because he is a believer or would he behave in that particular way even
if he did not believe. In other words is it the case that some Christians may
have a kind of universal morality that makes them do certain things separate
from the religious part of morality that would have made them act otherwise.
To give an example, the part of my moral code that normally prevents me from
killing my neighbor and taking his property seems to have nothing to do with
my religious beliefs and that is the kind of morality I usually tend to act on if
there are no other instructions form, for example, from my priest. Now, I have
a vision or some of the elders of my church tell me that I should kill this very
neighbor, what do I do then? Normally I think I would not kill that person,
but a great number of Christians and also, in much smaller number of cases,
3 Japanese morality based in a great extend on the notion of shame is a secular one in most
of its essential areas and the Japanese society is regarded as one of safest and most orderly
societies in the world.
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Buddhists for some reasons have made diﬀerent choices, clearly because of their
religious beliefs.
For any educated Europeans or Americans there is no need to remind famous
sayings from the New Testament concerning not resisting evil, turning the other
cheek or loving enemies. The paciﬁstic and nonviolent ideas of the early Christian
church seems to have prevailed to our times, thought the history of Christianity
since the Constantine is anything but such. Baiton in his book Christian Attitudes
Toward War and Peace points out that “The obvious point of beginning is
the New Testament. Yet the New Testament has so little to say speciﬁcally
on the subject that from its pages can be derived only principles rather than
precepts. How those principles are to be applied the Christian must discover for
himself in the light of changing circumstances.”4 And later he continues: “Broadly
speaking, three attitudes to war and peace were to appear in the Christian ethic:
paciﬁsm, the just war, and the crusade. Chronologically they emerged in just this
order.”5 Because we feel that no speciﬁc precept applies to a given situation, the
interpretation of what principles and in what way should be applied remains free
for interpretation ﬁt to the liking of those in power to decide. The development
from paciﬁsm to just war and later to crusades seems more like regress than an
evolution. Baiton says that “Paciﬁsm is thus often associated with withdrawal,
the just war with qualiﬁed participation, and the crusade with dominance of the
Church over the world.6 So it would be closer to evolution of power and regress
of faith.
In case of Japan, the situation is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent when it comes to
morality and religion. In his monumental work Ways of Thinking of Eastern
Peoples: Inidia-China-Tibet-Japan Nakamura writes as follows: “In the ﬁrst place,
we should notice that the Japanese are willing to accept the phenomenal world as
Absolute because of their disposition to lay a greater emphasis upon intuitive
sensible concrete events, rather than upon universals. This way of thinking
with emphasis upon the ﬂuid, arresting character of observed events regards
the phenomenal world itself as Absolute and rejects the recognition of anything
existing over and above the phenomenal world.”7 It is essential to understand
this when considering Japanese Buddhism and Buddhist ethics. Also thanks to
this Japanese Buddhism was, for most of its history, free from frantic ideologically
4 Roland Herbert Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace. A Historical Survey
and Critical Re-evaluation, (New York: Abingdon Press, 1960), 13.
5 Ibid. 14.
6 Ibid p. 15.
7 Hajime Nakamura, Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India-China-Tibet-Japan, (Hono-
lulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1971), 350.
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based hatred that would motivate religious violence and most violence that has
occurred among various temples and schools of Buddhism was more about the
inﬂuence and power and less about religion and ethics, which seems to have made
it more independent of religion than everywhere else in the world.
It does not mean however that Japanese ethics was completely independent
from religion, but only suggests that both good and bad inﬂuence of religions
were not as visible as in Christianity. As Kalupahana points out “The Buddha’s
maximum claim in the sphere of the moral life was not to harm himself or others,
a claim he was able to uphold until the last moment of his life.”8 It is very
characteristic to Buddhism, when compared with Judaism or Christianity, that
our attitude to other beings gets a priority before the relation to god. When we
look at Ten Commandments, for example, we see that they stress the relation of
a believer with god and leaves the human relations as less important in the order of
priorities. With most Buddhist schools the ethics seems to be based on very simple
and clear notions of not harming other beings and accepting consequences of our
actions, but not as punishment, but merely as facts that follow from our choices.
Seiko Hirata says that “The early Buddhist posture of nonviolence was based not
on humanistic ideas about the value of life, but on a religious understanding of
the workings of karma9. The Buddha’s ultimate refusal to act for the sake of
clan and country was rooted in his belief that the Buddhist dharma transcends
ethnic and national concerns.”10 No doubt that karma has contributed a lot to the
development of nonviolence, but, on the other hand, if the humanistic ideas, maybe
not only of value of life, but also the precept of not causing pain to fellow beings as
a part of social order and morality, also had to play its part in forming the ethics
of nonviolence. This characteristics of looser connection between Buddhism and
social morality has contributed to less cases of abuse of religious ethics and wider
spread of tolerance. In contrast to early Christians, especially after Constantine,
where we may ﬁnd cases where the tolerance itself if fount intolerable, Buddhism
from its beginnings, in spite of numerous quarrels concerning orthodoxy, did not
develop clear justiﬁcation of violence. Since Buddhists were seldom persecuted in
the time of early formation of the religion they did not develop sectarian mentality
so clearly seen in Christianity.
8 David J Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist Philosophy. Continuities and Discontinuities,
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992), 112.
9 The notion of karma refers to action that bears consequences.
10 Seiko Hirata, Zen Buddhist Attitudes to War, In: James W. Heisig & John C. Maraldo edit.,
Rude Awakenings Zen, the Kyoto School, & the Question of Nationalism. (Honolulu:University
of Hawaii Press, 1995), 4.
260 TADEUSZ ADAM OŻÓG
And lastly we need to remember that religious is not an equivalent of moral
in a broader sense. There may be cases that religion requires that person behaves
immorally or for some reasons acts against his or her convictions. We say it not in
a sense of ethical relativism but to point out to cases of behavior that violates ones
moral code of a given society but is acceptable on religious grounds. This situation
usually occurs due to sophistication of religious systems and contradictions or
imperfections such systems may contain, which may be also extremely diﬃcult
to spot.
Faith and organized religion
The change in paradigm seems to be the reason of shifting the priorities
from individual salvation to the protection of churches or temples as the tools of
salvation of many, for the greater good. The greater good idea itself poses a great
problem, since if followed consequently would have had to change our world and
society completely. So it is invoked only when convenient, but applied carefully
and with quite many limitations.
In case of early Christianity the teaching seemed to be followed to the letter
no matter what the consequences were. Christians were choosing to be faithful
even if it was to cost them not only their own lives but also lives of others. The
nonconformist attitude had its contribution to acceptance of violence, however
the building the church organization and shearing carrying out and experiencing
the violence was crucial in shaping the morality of the early Christians. Another
interesting characteristics of creating early Christian church is handling of idolatry
which also contributed a lot not only to increase of violence but also to its
acceptance. Many Christian solders of the Roman army have not refused killing
or inﬂicting pain on others but only making sacriﬁces to pagan goods. The further
back in time we go, the clearer it becomes, that Christianity was truly paciﬁstic
and non violent religion for an extremely short period of time, and that preaching
nonviolence and utilizing violent behavior in the same time is seen thorough
most of its history. Furthermore one may risk saying that whenever Christians
were able to implement violence they were choosing to do so. Though it may
not apply to individual believers or churches in areas where Christianity was
a minority, but once Christian organization was in place, the individuals tended
to act on quite diﬀerent ethical percepts. The fact that when Christianity becomes
oﬃcial religion of the Roman Empire violence becomes a wildly used practice of
governance in both secular and religious realms also shows the above statement
to be true. Similar view may be found in Thomsetts history of Inquisition. “How
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did the Church evolve from the representative of peaceful philosophy of Christ
into such an authoritarian worldly power? In the matter of its response to heresy,
the Church’s progression from nonviolence all the way to burning people at the
stake has to be traced through the time when the Church aligned itself with the
power of the Roman Empire to become the Roman Catholic Church. The point
of view that heresy and other crimes against God or the Church deserved a death
sentence emerged around the end of the 4th century. Before that, excommunication
was considered an appropriate punishment for non-temporal crime. St. Optatus
of Mileve was the ﬁrst to cite Old Testament examples to justify a sentence
of death.”11
The case of Japanese Buddhism is much simpler. Through most of its history
in Japan Buddhism had never claimed the absolute power over lay believers or
even over the clergy. With some exceptions of Jo¯doshu¯ or PureLand and Jo¯do
Shinshu¯ or True Pure Land schools which will be discussed brieﬂy later in the
article, followers were almost free to believe anything they wanted, as long as
they followed the percepts and attend the rituals. Monks of one school could
often participate freely in rituals of other sects and basically believers were not
required to be aﬃliated with temples until early 17th, what accidently is related
to ban of Christianity that arrived to Japan about 60 years earlier. Because of
its tolerant character the development and spread of the Buddhist faith did not
lead in the direction of absolute dominance of one school or emergence of one
dominant orthodoxy. The schools were mostly in state of healthy competition
and the court and later the military governments were quite happy to keep
it that way. For this reason the cases of violence among lay believers based
on ideological or interpretational diﬀerences of the teaching had no place even
when the religious organizations have developed enough to trigger this king of
behavior. The prominent Japanese philosopher Keiji Nishitani summarizes the
relation between the believers and the religious organizations as follows. “People
involve themselves with religion through activities such as Buddhist services or
funerals, which are regarded more as social customs, and these religious activities
are not tied to an individual’s religious selfconsciousness. Here it is evident that
religion does not have a ﬁrm grip on the individual person. This is connected with
the fact that religion does not seem prepared to meet the religious demands of
individuals at a level beyond mere social custom.”12
11 Michael C. Thomsett, The Inquisition A History, (Jeﬀerson: McFarland & Company, Inc.,
Publishers 2010), 3.
12 Kenji Nishitani, On Buddhism, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 24.
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Forms and origins of organized violence in Christianity
from its early history to crusades and inquisition
When we consider the problem of violence in Christianity we may notice two
main sources of it: one is the conditions of persecution Christians were exposed
to in the early years of the religion development that supported emergence of
sectarian mentality and victimology, that justiﬁed later revenge and vengeance,
and another on is acceptance of the Old Testament vision of God, who, as
shown in the Book of Exodus, The Book of Joshua and numerous other places,
actively participated in exercising violence on the enemies of Israelites. And
as Michael Gaddis points out there were no limits to its abuse. “Accounts of
religious conﬂict in late antiquity abound with murder, torture, and beating, from
the suﬀerings of the martyrs to the vengeful punishment of unbelievers, not to
mention acts of desecration against buildings or objects of worship—all of which
we would have no trouble characterizing as quite straightforward manifestations
of physical violence.”13 He also claims that “For the ﬁrst three centuries of their
history, Christians were in little position to employ signiﬁcant violence either
in defense of their faith or in their own internal disputes. Nevertheless, the
worldview shaped during the early centuries is essential to understanding the
violent conﬂicts of later times. Earliest Christianity postulated a world sharply
divided between truth and falsehood, beset by perceived enemies both out-
side and within.”14
The image of the God of Old Testament who is a character that himself
exercises extreme violence and is an initiator of unspeakable atrocities when it
ﬁts his plan of salvation for his chosen people has contributed a lot to acceptance
of violence as a way of fulﬁlling gods will and also to developing of mechanism
of moral exceptions for actions that could be classiﬁed as prompted by god. For
example killing might have been wrong but if the victim was an enemy, and it was
god’s will, the killing was morally acceptable, and not only not punishable but
even regarded as suitable for reward. It may be illustrated by a citation from John
Malalas Chronicles where it is believed that god himself ordered the assassination.
“That same night Basil, the most holy bishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia, saw in
a dream the heavens opened and the Saviour Christ seated on a throne and saying
loudly, ‘Mercurius, go and kill the emperor Julian, who is against the Christians’.
St Mercurius, standing before the Lord, wore a gleaming iron breast-plate. (334)
13 Michael Gaddis, There Is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ. Religious Violence in the
Christian Roman Empire, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 3.
14 Ibid., 23.
ON SOME INSTANCES OF VIOLENCE OR KILLING AND THEIR JUSTIFICATION... 263
Hearing the command, he disappeared, and then he re-appeared, standing before
the Lord, and cried out, ‘The emperor Julian has been fatally wounded and has
died, as you commanded, Lord’.”15
After Christianity has become the state religion of Roman Empire it has
evolved into a powerful institution that needed to add one more important
task to its priorities, which was the self-preservation, an aspect which was later
used to justify almost any kind of behavior on religious grounds. As Michael
Gaddis discusses in the earlier mentioned book “Like the state, a church consisted
of a hierarchically organized institutional structure that attempted to exercise
a monopoly of power, in this case, over spiritual authority and the deﬁnition of
religious truth, as well as a monopoly in a more concrete fashion, over ecclesiastical
space and public worship services.”16 This ﬁxation on monopoly became one of
representative features of Christianity and seem to have been exercised whenever
the conditions allowed it. No need to say, that the real motivations for actions
that were in accordance with gaining and maintaining religious and, if possible,
secular monopoly had to be disguised, particularly in cases that required violence,
with plausible explanation for such actions. One of such rationalizations that also
applies to religious authorities can be found in Michael Gaddis’s book. “The
tragedy of state violence lay in the fact that its perpetrators all too often believed
themselves to be acting with the best of intentions: charity, didactic responsibility,
and an authoritarian paternalism that allowed them to justify a ‘disciplinary’
coercion they knew was in their subjects’ own best interests.”17 The justiﬁcation
of violent actions that they were being carried out for the sake of the victims
became omnipresent and probably most often used in the western cultures, both
in religious and secular areas.
The theological diﬀerences and seeking victory over opponents seem to have
been much more important than good life and harmony in the community. Once
violence was accepted as a possible solution to theological problems, then, also
due to necessary vengeance, there was no way to stop it and try nonviolent alter-
natives. And gloriﬁcation of martyrdom also is to blame for contributing to the
omnipresence of violence in the Christian reality. The agreement on controversial
topics, such as acceptance of the Nicene Creed, was possible in Christianity only
by inﬂicting excessive power, violence and persecutions, but never by peaceful
discussions and some kinds of compromises. For that reason one may expect that
15 Elizabeth Jeﬀreys, Michael Jeﬀreys and Roger Scott trans. The Chronicle of John Malalas,
(Melbourne: Australian Association for Byzantine Studies, 1986), 181–182.
16 Michael Gaddis, There Is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ. Religious Violence in the
Christian Roman Empire, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 21.
17 Ibid p. 65.
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there must be something in Christian teaching that lets everybody who believes
that only they themselves are right and anybody else is wrong.
Jonathan Riley-Smith sees as an outcome of tradition of sacred violence that
was present in Christianity for centuries. “Crusade theory was an adaptation
of a much more ancient tradition of Christian sacred violence, the foundations
of which had been laid by theologians in the fourth and ﬁfth centuries, in
a Roman empire which was now Christian, with a government that had assumed
the responsibilities of its pagan predecessor for assuring internal order and
defence.”18 And later he adds an explanation of another crucial factor, which is
an incentive for an individual to participate in carrying out the violence. “Crusade
propagandists took trouble to conform their arguments to the patristic criteria
of right intention, just cause and legitimate authority, because throughout the
history of the crusading movement people had to be persuaded that the danger
to which they were going to expose themselves was worthwhile.”19
Circumstances are quite diﬀerent with Inquisition. Most violence was done
here systematically and planned to the smallest detail, so we can’t say that
perpetrators acted on their rage or madness. In such case we need to ask how was
it possible that persecutors, who usually were man of the cloth, did not hesitate to
voluntarily and repeatedly inﬂict unbearable pain of fellow Christians? Here, as in
times of early church the violence was not justiﬁed by gaining personal salvation
(for example martyrdom) and passage to heaven by the perpetrator or persecutor,
but was motivated by the care for the victims. Why was the torture necessary? One
probable answer would be, to apply purifying power of pain and suﬀering. And
the only simple justiﬁcation: for the good of the victims. But how the inquisitors
could believe with no doubt that that was the right way? Nowadays the argument
concerning permissibility of torture seems to be circulating around it eﬀectiveness
in reaching certain goals, but we tend to forget its ethical dimensions. Anyhow,
comparing the inquisition and crusades as two diﬀerent types of violence, we can
notice here that when the violence is committed by monks, clergy or initiated
by them, there is a tendency to employ the care for victims justiﬁcation, and
when the crimes are to be committed by lay believers on much bigger scale, the
justiﬁcation by the good of victims seems not to be that important as securing
suﬃciently tempting intensives.
18 Jonathan Riley-Smith, Christian Violence and the Crusades. In: Anna Sapir Abulaﬁa edit.
Religious Violence between Christians and Jews. Medieval Roots, Modern Perspectives, (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 5.
19 Ibid., 6.
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Warrior Monks and Japanese Buddhism
Unfortunately there is no much literature in western languages devoted to
the problem of warrior monks in Japan. Because of perception of Buddhism as
a paciﬁstic religion in most cases only those familiar with speciﬁcity of Japanese
Buddhism are aware of their existence. Only recently the problem of Buddhism
and violence has surfaced again in connection with monk’s involvement in Sri
Lanka.20 Books and articles concerning the so¯hei or warrior monks in Japanese
are also quite scarce. Serious studies on the topic seem to have started before the
Paciﬁc War and were continued by a few scholars only for some time after the war.
And relatively recently in 2003 the history of warrior monks was published which
was written by two generations of so¯hei scholars, Sho¯ichi Hioki and his son Eigo¯
Hioki.21 However there are some issues that Japanese scholars seem not to pay
suﬃcient attention to. One is the very deﬁnition of warrior monks and another
one is concentrating on the social and historical aspects of the phenomenon and
not paying much attention on the religious aspects the contradiction of being
a warrior monk.
When we compare the history of development of Christianity and Buddhism,
we can see that in the case of Buddhism diﬀerent schools of thought and inter-
pretations of Buddha’s teaching usually were coexisting in peace and, in contrast
to Christianity, were not trying or had no means to dominate and destroy
each other at any cost. In Christianity the readiness to destroy all heresies
had doubtlessly something to do with acceptance of violence and eagerness
to use it. The claims to heaving the only truth and the only right interpretation
of religious teaching not only allowed but also justiﬁed any atrocities that those
implementing violence deemed necessary. Christianity seemed never tolerant to
anything incompatible with its teaching, if only had a power do destroy or
overcome the opponent. The tolerance came only with decreasing of power to
implement violence and exercise the power that would guard the purity of the
only true faith.
Here again when we try to make comparisons with Buddhism it is clear that
Buddhism never was able to develop mechanisms of forcing its teachings on some-
body by implementing violence and secular power, nor has ever used signiﬁcant
violence to guard the purity of its teaching. The varieties of Buddhists schools
that were active throughout its history are so abundant, that almost any possible
interpretation is accounted for, from true atheism to theology almost identical
20 Refer to: Mahinda Deegalle edit., Buddhism, Conﬂict and Violence in Modern Sri Lanka
(New York: Routlege, 2006).
21 Eigo Hioki edit., So¯hei no rekishi, (Tokyo: Ebusu Kosyo Publication Co., Ltd., 2003).
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with catholic teaching. For that very reason we may try to look for the causes of
such mutations and explain but not justify the acceptance and usage of violence
in some of Japanese Buddhist schools.
Taking the above into consideration it seems that there is no doubt that the
very emergence of warrior monks in Japan is closely related to secularization of
Buddhist Monasticism. As early as the Nara period (710–794) the power, wealth
and inﬂuence of Buddhist monasteries was prodigious enough to justify the need
not only for protection but also securing means of acquiring more. But from
written materials concerning that period that we have we can presume that at
that stage people employed as guards and, when needed, as a private army were
not monks, but more likely that they were slaves belonging to the temples or
members of lower rank lay servants. Some iconography depicts the warrior monks
as persons with shaved heads or with their heads cowered with cowls, what would
suggest that they may have taken vows and were a part of clergy, but we need to
remember also that the iconography shows mostly how these warrior monks were
perceived by the painter, thus a popular image that could have been diﬀerent from
the real state of aﬀairs. As Mikael Adolpson points out “The presence of armed
fellows among the lower-ranking clergy is indisputable, but the above account still
oﬀers no support of the view that they were full-ﬂedged monks. If anything, the
note about the acolyte wearing armor together with a monk’s robe points in the
opposite direction, indicating that armed clerics were little more than monastic
employees.”22
The situation changes by the end of Heian Period (794–1185) when the
Enryakuji temple of Kyoto23 in several occasions seemed to exercise their power
employing armed groups that were perceived as regular private army of the
monastery. In case of the Enryakuji Temple the warrior monks seemed to be
used mainly to execute the inﬂuence of the temple on other Buddhist schools
within the city or on the secular government.
As Mikael Adolphson points out, after a Japanese scholar Toshio Kuroda,24
when considering any historical phenomena or events we can’t concentrate only
on its secular or only on its religious aspect. Kuroda distinguishes three diﬀerent
institutions of power that not only rule and administer the country, but also,
in most cases, warrant and try preserve each other advantages. “These elites
were the leaders of three power blocs—the court nobles (ko`ke or kuge), the
22 Mikael S. Adolphson, The Teeth And Claws Of The Buddha: Monastic Warriors And So¯hei
In Japanese History, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007), 61.
23 Nowadays the Enryakuji Temple is located within boundaries of Otsu City, Shiga Prefecture,
but the location physically has not changed since the 9th century.
24 Toshio Kuroda, Kuroda Toshio Chosakushu¯, (Kyoto:Hozokan, 1994).
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warrior aristocracy (buke), and temples and shrines (jisha)—which ruled the realm
together by sharing responsibilities of government and supporting each other’s
privileges and status.”25 In fact, in Japan, since the introduction of Buddhism
in 6th century, in spite of several attempts to use religion for political purposes,
long-lasting antagonism between the native religion of Shinto and Buddhism or
among various schools of Buddhism never has really developed. Another fact
contributing to maintaining generally peaceful characteristics of Buddhism in
Japan was failure to develop supremacy of one particular school over others,
strong enough that the school or sect could get enough inﬂuence on secular and
military powers to grant them suﬃcient troops to destroy the opponents. In case
of the court and later of the military governments, they seemed eager to rather
maintain a healthy balance of power between competing temples or schools that
to get involved, also military, in resolving any theological or economical issues
they might have had.
But even under such well balanced conditions, such contradictions as warrior
monks have emerged. This fact is not to be neglected, but for us not the historicity
of the group is as important as trying to consider if those called warrior monks were
indeed properly ordained monks or were called so only because they were armed
forces used by temples or aﬃliated with the temple in some other way? If the
second was the case they may as well have been bandits or trained peasants just
hired by the temples to do their dirty work. But for us the problem is that, were
they properly ordained monks, what would be the motivation to act against their
vows? The interpretation of so¯hei as ordained monks is supported by Toshiharu
Hirata in his article26 So¯hei ron (Theory on Monk Warriors). Unfortunately we
do not have any conclusive evidence as to a single answer to our problem. It is
very likely that during few hundred years of history, where the notion of warrior
monks appears now and then, its essence has changed completely. However even
though there is no suﬃcient account that would substantiate any attempt of
describing their motivations, we may risk some statements to eliminate some
motives as unlikely.
As in the case of crusades we were able to easily point out at least few motives,
starting with securing a passage to heaven up to doing god’s will for the good of the
victims. In case of Buddhist warrior monks non of those motivations is plausible
enough. Taking into consideration the above conditions we may reason that in
case of Japanese warrior monks the religious aspect of motivations to violate
25 Mikael S. Adolphson, The Gates of Power. Monks, Courtiers, and Warriors in Premodern
Japan, (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2000), 11.
26 Toshiharu Hirata, So¯hei ron, In: Yukio O¯shima edit. So¯hei no hasseiki ni kansuru isshikiron,
(Tokyo: Komazawa Daigaku Daigakuin Shigakukai Kodaishi Bukai, 1978).
268 TADEUSZ ADAM OŻÓG
the basic teaching was close to none and their very existence and behavior had
almost entirely secular foundations. They had no reasons to expect any religious
gratiﬁcations, rewards or positive religious consequences of their doings, there
was no one to absolve them from taking responsibility for their actions. The
secularity and the sole military aspect of the phenomenon may be also found in
two most prominent cases that had shaped the popular image of warrior monks in
Japan. One is the literary character of Benkei27 and another one is the complete
destruction of Enryakuji temple by Nobunaga Oda in 16th century.
Since the vows of not harming or killing living beings would be clearly violated
by the kind of behavior the warrior monks were accused of, it is very likely that
those involved were not at all or seldom members of the proper monastic hierarchy
and from the documents mentioning their appearances follows that, if they had
anything to do with the religious ordain at all, they probably were private monks
or would be monks that preferred absolute freedom and violence than prayer
or just occasional mob consisting of lay followers. In any case, compared with
Christian Military Orders, the scale or level of institualization of Japanese warrior
monks was so small and low, that there is no suﬃcient basis for making any serious
comparison.
Ikko¯ Ikki religious uprisings
However the situation is quite diﬀerent with the case of religious uprisings and
violence employed not by monks, though they were mostly only the initiators, but
by ordinary lay followers. The uprisings seem to be a consequence of secularization
and empowerment of temples and shrines mainly during Muromachi Period
(1337–1573) and also due to weakening of Muromachi military government and
spreading violence between feudal lords for acquiring land and inﬂuence. We need
to remember that not all uprisings were related to religious institutions, but for
the purpose of this article we will brieﬂy examine two, that were doubtlessly
of a religious background. The ﬁrst is Ikko¯-ikki or Ikko¯ Uprising and another
one is Shimabara no ran or Shimabara Uprising. The Ikko¯ Uprising is diﬃcult
to describe and evaluate since it consists of numerous separate uprisings that
had occurred over more than hundred years, but all of them have in common
27 The charecter of Benkei populararized through numerous stories and theatre plays, especially
the famous kabuki play Kanjincho¯, contributed a lot to how the warrior monks were perceived
by ordinary population. But even partially a legend, we can see that he was more a warrior than
a monk anyway.
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the involvement of the Jo¯do Shinshu¯ (True Pure Land) sect of Buddhism also
called the Ikko¯ sect. As McMulling points out “It should not be thought that
the Ikko¯ uprisings were simply sporadic outbursts involving only a few hundred
people. In the latter half of the sixteenth century there were occasions on
which tens of thousands of monto28 were mobilized, many of them equipped
with ﬁrearms.”29
During 16th century, the Warring States Period, the True Pure Land sect
have established a Ishiyama Honganji fortress temple as main center of power,
that served not so much religious purposes, but rather economic, political and
military ones. For some time it seemed there was no single secular power that
could threaten or overcome this religious empire. But shortly it turned out that
this overconﬁdence brought the religious power and many lives of the followers
to end. Nobunaga Oda, who was the initiator of uniﬁcation of the warring states,
soon found out that the Ishiyama Honganji temple and the followers of the
True Pure Land sect became a great obstacle on this way. Both sides were not
reluctant and did not hesitate to use necessary force and violence, the religious
institution to protect its secular power, and Oda to get closer to his goal of
unifying the country. Oda was a warrior and not religious enough to feel pity
for his opponents, no matter clerics or lay. The situation should be diﬀerent on
the side of the True Pure Land sect. One could suppose that since in case of
so¯hei, because most likely they were neither proper monks and probably nor
real followers of the path of Buddha, the use of violence was not much of an
issue. However, the situation with Ikko¯ uprisings and ﬁghts with Nobunaga forces
was quite diﬀerent. Here the violence was carried out by ordinary lay believers
who, because of being Buddhists, should not indulge in violence or killing. The
motivations for lay followers to join the violence McMullin describes as follows.
“Kennyo seased pretending to be uninvolved in the struggle against Nobunaga,
and on October 5, 1570, he sent out appeals to the monto of seven provinces
around Osaka to defend Shinran’s ‘Lights of the [Buddhist] Law’ by making war
on Nobunaga whom he referred to as the ‘enemy of the [Buddhist] Law (hoteki).
In those appeals Kennyo encouraged the monto to be willing to give up their lives
in order to prevent Nobunaga from destroying the ‘school of our founder’ (kaizan
no ichiryu), and he enforced his appeals by threatening to excommunicate any
monto who failed to heed them.30”
28 Monto is a term that designates a lay followers of certain school of Buddhism usually
associated with a speciﬁc temple.
29 Neil McMullin, Buddhism and the State in Sixteenth-Century Japan, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984), 48.
30 Ibid., 106.
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In case of Pure Land and True Pure Land Buddhism we see a radical shift in
the basic Buddhist belief on salvation from jiriki31 to tariki32. It meant not only
moving the whole burden of salvation from the believer to the merciful god, but
also gave the clergy elites control over the mediation and methods of salvations,
and furthermore ways of providing intensives for easy control of the behavior of
followers. Not only that but it also created a great danger of abuse by religious
authorities, since believers were not granted salvation because of what they do
or did, but only because of the mercy and benevolence of god. Because of this
following the authorities even on morally doubtful and purposeless cause was not
perceived as a sinful conduct. In other words they believed that they were saved
not because of what they did with their lives, as would most Buddhist schools
believe, but only because of the good will of their god.
Lastly we also need to mention brieﬂy the Shimabara Rebellion (1637–38).
Historians don’t quite agree on how the Christian aspect of the uprising should
be evaluated, but since the Christianity was present at all stages of the uprising
and most participants are regarded to be believers we may categorize it as the
relatively large religious uprising. Here again looking at the only two signiﬁcant
religious uprisings in the history of Japan, we notice that both involve religions
that have such features as the authoritarian hierarchy and salvation through mercy
of god, in common.
How are these instances of violence explained and justiﬁed?
As we have seen, in spite of violence and actions clearly opposite to the
moral teaching of a given religion which are treated and condemned as such,
unfortunately there are also actions of violence that are accepted and not treated
as morally punishable. The reasons for violent behavior based on religious and non
religious motivations are in a way similar, but also have a few distinctive features.
If we look at the God of the Old Testament we do not see any justiﬁcation of
killing of whole tribes based on the good of the victims, but the only justiﬁcation
is the good of the perpetrators and the doing of the will of the God. This led
to reasoning that the God’s mandate justiﬁes any kind of behavior and moral
rules do not apply whatsoever. This God’s mandate though seen in a slightly
31 The term “jiriki” means by one’s own power and refers to obtaining salvation or nirvana
due to one’s own eﬀorts.
32 The term “tariki” means someone’s power and refers to obtaining salvation through one’s
own eﬀorts but by the act of will of the god.
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diﬀerent form in China, is quite absent from Japanese history. The presence of
Tenno¯ or the Emperor of Japan, who was also believed to be a god, supplied the
mandate for secular powers, but never was involved in any matters concerning
solutions to problems of religious controversy. Another important characteristics
is that even the Emperor was believed to be a god, he never had an absolute
power and because of him being on Earth, and available for consultations, the
abuse of the God’s will notion in Japan was close to impossible.33
The God’s mandate idea developed later into the form of Christian Catholic
church hierarchy who’s absolute power and authority, the right to decide on all
matters without any limitations. Since it was not possible to conﬁrm if something
is or is not God’s will, the power of the church was literally unlimited and the
morality and ethics was left solely to the church’s liking. The followers of such
a church had no reason to doubt and no reason to fear any consequences of
any conduct as long as they had a blessing of the church. About the nature of
authority, Benn Piers writes as follows “To be in authority entails having the
right to obedience, at least in certain speciﬁc circumstances. It is diﬀerent from
power, which is simply the ability to enforce your wishes regardless of your right
to do so. At the same time, the position of being in authority does not necessarily
bring with it wisdom, justice or any particular expertise. A foolish person may be
in authority over others, through being placed in that position by some agreed
procedure, for instance, by being put there (‘authorized’) by somebody already
in authority. Whether the authority he claims is genuine usually depends more
on the legitimacy of the procedures which put him in this role than on his own
personal qualities.”34
Apart from the authoritarian mechanism that shapes the evolution and
application of the teaching and also supplies systems of punishments and rewards,
there is also another level of motivations that are available for some believers. They
are based on personal judgments concerning actions based not on the authority of
the organization, church or temple, but on eﬀort to objectively apply the teaching
to particular circumstances and cases. It presumes availability of the means of
veriﬁcation and also a lot of personal courage. If we take into consideration the
motivations of Christians attacking pagan temples, crusaders killing nonbelievers
and inquisitors torturing or ordering the tortures of fellow Christians it seems
that they had almost no chance and felt no need to verify actions against the
Christian teaching because they probably were convinced that the teaching itself
33 Abuse of Imperial Institution during Meiji Restoration and Paciﬁc War may seem to proof
that this argument is false, but both cases concerned are not directly related to religion thus
have no say here.
34 Piers Benn, Ethics, (London: UCL Press, 1998), 6.
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justiﬁes their conduct, especially in the situation where the teaching was shaped
in a way to look as if the justiﬁcation was suﬃcient and thorough.
In case of Japanese Buddhism, in spite of Japanese being very vulnerable in
face of authority, with exception of Pure Land and True Pure Land sects, as we
have already mentioned, the religious authority was never absolute, what allowed
for development of personal responsibility and necessity of evaluation of plural
ethical systems that were available at a given time. It is well known that most
Japanese in the past as it is now were both Shintoists and Buddhists as well, and
the fact that those religions are not compatible did not cause any problems. To
be interested in and even actively participate in diﬀerent schools of Buddhism or
even quite diﬀerent religion was seldom regarded as something morally wrong and
this natural state of religious pluralism and tolerance created conditions where
believers were extremely seldom faced with the real dilemma of acting against
their moral convictions and committing violence for religious reasons in cases they
would not do it if the religious justiﬁcation was not in place. Furthermore even
if facing such situations, the veriﬁcation of options itself, the doubt itself, would
never be a sin. It seems that the teaching of Karma as objective law that can’t
be modiﬁed by any authority save Buddhism and Buddhists from committing
violence and killing for religious reasons.
Fallowing from the authoritarian conviction that one knows better and has
a right and authority to act on it, comes the strong belief of acting for the victims
sake. As Gaddis puts it “The violence of the center always justiﬁed itself as being
in the best interests of its victims—for their own good, whether they knew it
or not.”35 Though omnipresent in all atrocities committed by Christians, this
justiﬁcation has not been seen in Japan much. Neither the warrior monks, nor
the followers of True Pure Land sect giving their lives to protect the teaching of
their school were doing it convinced that it can do some good to their victims.
It seems clear that due to lack of this kind of ﬂexible justiﬁcation a signiﬁcant
amount of religious violence was avoided.
And the last of the main justifying factors is the existence of the ultimate
award and the sure way of obtaining it. Extreme violence justiﬁed on religious
grounds comes from extreme forms of egoism and uncontrolled urge to gain one’s
own salvation at any cost. Just wars and crusades promised the participants
salvation or opportunity for penance that would eventually lead to salvation.
And once the salvation is granted, there are no limits to what one will do.
35 Michael Gaddis, There Is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ. Religious Violence in the
Christian Roman Empire (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 7.
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Conclusion
“Claims that religion is ‘an actor in its own right’ or that it ‘causes violence’
are subtly misleading and reveal that we have made a mistake in logical thinking.
This mistake is called the ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’ whereby we have
treated an abstract concept as though it were a concrete entity having agency in
its own right.”36 Burns claims that because of reiﬁcation37 we tend to believe that
religion itself can be acting agent, but in fact only human agents are able to be so.
But even if religion has no characteristics of an actor, the religious organization
has and religious ideas have the power to act through both, these organizations
and believers as well being initiators of actions both moral and non moral.
When we think about monks in late antiquity attacking pagan temples and
massacring and killing pagan idolaters we need to be aware that their actions
may not be self motivated voluntary actions but rather forced on them, or being
just consequence of certain beliefs and ideas that are primary sources of certain
behavior and actions. We may say that they had a free will to choose to act
on them or not, but it may not be that simple. Certain ideas they had followed
where the primary actors there and the situation that allowed such acts was just
a trigger. Usually this kinds of behaviors may be controlled by external laws,
fears or wish to avoid consequences, but once these controlling factors are not
present anymore or lose their eﬀectiveness for some reason, the idea may become
an initiator and motor of violent acts. In consequence religious teachers, those who
propagate these ideas, even if they declare that violence was not their intention,
need to take responsibility for violent actions of those who act on ideas thought
by those teachers.
Nowadays it is wildly accepted in the western countries that Islam is the only
violent religion we need do deal with and should be the only target of criticism.
But if we try to look at what’s happening now with Islam from the standpoint of
history of the Judaism and Christianity, we can’t ignore the fact that Judaism and
Christianity oﬀer exactly the same capacity for violence as Islam does. No need to
say, all these religions have also great potential to spread peace. We should also
try to utilize the knowledge we gain from analyzing the mechanisms of religious
violence to protect ourselves and the society from avoidable and unnecessary
suﬀering. But how can we protect ourselves from violent religions? This is not an
easy question, but also a one we can’t ignore. Not letting religions have power to
implement any kind of violence or exposing and identifying religions that justiﬁed,
36 Charlene P. E. Burns, More Moral than God. Taking Responsibility for Religious Violence,
(Lanham: Rowman & Littleﬁeld Publishers, 2008), 1.
37 Burns deﬁnes the term as error of regarding phenomena as concrete objects.
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justify or have a capacity to justify violence are only some possible solutions. To
justify any violence or atrocity once one gets ﬂexible system of rewards that
would attract the salvation gamblers does not seem diﬃcult at all. The methods
and reasons used for justiﬁcation seem to be universal for all religions, but, as
we have seen, some religions are less likely to oﬀer tools for justiﬁcation and
others may be able to supply them quite easily. This is also extremely important
point for individuals when they chose their religion or belief, because the choice
usually comes with all the consequences of both, proper use and abuse of the
religious faith.
We do not to wish to pass any judgments or evaluate any behaviors of those
individuals and institutions involved in the instances we have presented in this
short article. The only thing we were aiming at was presenting some mechanism
and possible explanations of actions and their justiﬁcations related to contradic-
tions in religious ethical systems. Since we are aware that human conditions allow
for denying or accepting judgments in spite and against any reasonable proof and
reasoning, showing clear conclusions will not present any additional values to pre-
sented earlier argument. It is for the reader to decide what conclusions to draw
and how to evaluate them.
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